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Reference Magnetism and Macro-Naturalism1 
1. Introduction 
Realist theories of reference address the question of what objective feature it is in virtue of which a 
word, e.g., ‘Columbus’, refers to the object that it does, i.e., Columbus, rather than, say, Portland. 
Hilary Putnam (1977: 123-140) argues that such features don’t exist, so there is no “semantic glue” 
that ties our words to their referents. The purpose of this paper is to trace the attempts made by 
philosophers such as David Lewis and Theodore Sider to find this glue. By exploring the dispute 
between these two philosophers and their opponents, I hope to illustrate the basic requirements on 
a theory attempting to secure reference and also illustrate why their theories don’t satisfy those 
requirements.  
2. Putnam 
 
2.1 Charity 
 
I will start, as Putnam does, with the notion of intentionality: the idea that words and sentences in a 
given language are, in fact, about the world; they have intentional content. The notion of 
intentionality is important for any theory of reference because it motivates the assumption that 
words not only refer, but also they refer to objects in the world. That is, for any particular language, 
say L, L is informative and about the world. To interpret L is to determine what particular objects 
are assigned to words in L. The interpretation that is intuitively accurate, i.e., one that assigns the 
right objects to names and the right extensions to predicates, is the intended interpretation. A model of a 
theory is an interpretation of the language in which the sentences of the theory are written and that 
makes those sentences true. Various theories of reference differ about what principles guide 
reference assignments and, thus, in virtue of what words in L refer to the objects that they do, i.e., 
the objects assigned under the intended interpretation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I would like to thank Ben Caplan for an immense amount of support and insight during the process of completing this 
thesis.  
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For the purposes of my project, we can assume that the intended interpretation is one that is 
a model of a theory that contains sentences in L that express the beliefs of speakers of L. We do this 
because we assume that, ceteris paribus, speakers of L are rational and, therefore, that, ceteris paribus, 
they have true beliefs. Thus, we have the intuition that, ceteris paribus, utterances in L that express 
those beliefs are true.2  
Granting the assumption that speakers intend to refer and use predicates in such a way that 
those sentences that express their beliefs are true, we can characterize an initial principle for 
reference—call this ‘the Principle of Charity’ or ‘PC’: 
The Principle of Charity (PC): The intended interpretation of a language L is one on 
which referents are assigned to expression in L in a manner that makes the sentences of a 
theory T true, where T is the set of sentences of L that express the beliefs of speakers of L.3 
In the next part of this paper, I will provide a counterexample that will motivate revision to this 
principle.  
2.2 Counterexample One: Approximation World 
Imagine a scenario in which Mario is asked to partake in a guessing contest. The task of the contest 
is to guess the approximate number of Jellybeans in The Mason Jar.4 The only way to win the 
contest is to be the individual whose guess comes closest to the precise number of beans without 
going over that number. Mario, having an esteemed reputation for confectionary speculations, 
confidently asserts 
(1) There are at least 742 Jellybeans in The Mason Jar. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 My interest for this paper is to investigate the various theories that attempt to offer principles by which we can 
determine reference. A speaker’s beliefs presumably have intentional content and, therefore, one might ask in virtue of 
what those beliefs latch on to the objects that they do.  However, for my purposes, it is sufficient to assume that a 
speaker’s beliefs adequately correspond to the sentences in L that are true.  
3 Philosophers who invoke the notion of charity disagree about how best to characterize the principle of charity. For 
reasons discussed above, my characterization relies heavily on the assumption that speakers of L have true beliefs; 
however, we will return to the details of this discussion in §4.2. 
4 For simplicity, throughout my paper, ‘The Mason Jar’ will act as a proper name.  
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As it turns out, there are actually 927 Jellybeans in the jar that is in front of Mario at the time he 
utters (1), 742 of which were hand-picked earlier by David Klein at the Jellybelly headquarters in 
Fairfield, California.  
If we interpret Mario’s utterance in an intuitively correct manner, we would choose an 
interpretation that assigns to ‘The Mason Jar’ the jar that is in front of Mario at the time that he 
utters (1) and that assigns to ‘Jellybeans’ the set of all Jellybeans5—call this the ‘I-interpretation’.6 On 
the I-interpretation, Mario has not guessed the precise number of Jellybeans; however, luckily for 
him, he has not guessed over 927 and no other contestant guessed a number closer to 927. 
Therefore, Mario has won the contest.  
There are, of course, other ways of interpreting Mario’s utterance.  For example, we might 
adopt an interpretation that assigns to ‘The Mason Jar’ the jar that is in front of Mario at the time 
that he utters (1) and that assigns to the predicate ‘Jellybean’ the set of Jellybeans that have the 
property being at some point hand-picked by David Klein at the Jellybelly headquarters in Fairfield, California—
call this the ‘A-interpretation’.7 On this interpretation, Mario also manages to live up to his 
reputation.  
 This example, in effect, illustrates Putnam’s model-theoretic argument. That is, both the I-
interpretation and the A-interpretation score equally well with regard to PC. Moreover, there are 
countless interpretations available that will satisfy PC, thereby yielding some (though not necessarily 
intuitive) intentional content. The intended interpretations that seem at odds with our intuitions are 
traditionally referred to as “bizarre” or “crazy.”8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Following Lewis (1986), I take all Jellybeans to include the Jellybeans located in all possible worlds. This becomes 
important in §3.2. 
6 ‘I’ is for ‘intuitive’. 
7 ‘A’ is for ‘approximation’. 
8 Williams (2007: 377), Hawthorne (2007: 1), and Sider (forthcoming: 29). 
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One way of illustrating the deficiencies of bizarre interpretations is testing whether they can 
account for counterfactual robustness, i.e., bizarre interpretations fail to account for counterfactual 
evidence.9  For example, if another contestant were to have guessed a number between 742 and 927, 
then Mario would have lost the contest. Intuitively, this counterfactual statement is true. Moreover, 
on the I-interpretation of these utterances, it is true.10 However, on the A-interpretation of the 
contestants’ utterances, the statement is false. Therefore, it seems that the A-interpretation is 
deficient, but with PC alone an interpreter has no way of motivating the I-interpretation over the A-
interpretation. 
Therefore, to block bizarre interpretations such as the A-interpretation, we’ll need to revise 
PC, to give us a different way of ranking some interpretations as more suitable than others. In the 
following section, I will discuss Lewis’s attempt to do this by positing his eligibility constraint. 
3. Lewis 
 
3.1 Eligibility Based on the Naturalness of the Reference Relata 
 
To block bizarre and unintended interpretations, e.g., the A-interpretation, Lewis proposes an 
additional constraint called ‘eligibility’. Lewis (1983a: 371) says 
I … propose that the saving constraint concerns the referent – not the referrer and 
not the causal channels between the two … . Reference consists in part of what we 
do in language or thought when we refer, but in part it consists in eligibility of the 
referent. And this eligibility to be referred to is a matter of natural properties. (Italics 
added) 
 
In other words, what Lewis calls ‘natural’ are those properties that are more eligible candidates for 
reference and, thus, act as magnets for reference.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Sider (forthcoming: 36-37) uses a similar strategy for illustrating the weakness of charity. 
10 According to Putnam (1977), statements such as this counterfactual, PC, and other statements intended to guide 
theories of reference are just other sentences in T. Lewis (1984) responds to this objection; cf. §3.1 and n. 16. For the 
sake of brevity, assume that the interpretation of this counterfactual statement, other counterfactuals to follow, and the 
various principles of reference are not considered suspect.  
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These natural properties, which Lewis (1983a: 364) considers to be an “elite minority of 
special properties,” are useful only insofar as we can distinguish them from the majority of 
properties, which are “gerrymandered and miscellaneous … [and] superfluous in characterizing the 
world.” To help with this distinction, Lewis contrasts properties that he calls sparse and those that he 
calls abundant. The abundant properties are those that are “gruesomely gerrymandered,” 
“miscellaneously disjunctive,” and “carve things up every which way.”11 Conversely, of the sparse 
properties he says 
Sharing of them makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the joints, they are 
intrinsic, they are highly specific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not entirely 
miscellaneous, and there are only just enough of them to characterize things 
completely and without redundancy.12 
 
These sparse properties, then, constitute the natural properties.13 Therefore, following Lewis 
(1983a), the property being an electron might be natural, but the property detecting the Higgs boson is not. 
However, Lewis (1986) suggests that naturalness might come in degrees, making some properties 
more natural than others. In other words,  
Probably it would be best to say that the distinction between natural properties and 
others admits of degree. Some few properties are perfectly natural. Others, even 
though they may be somewhat disjunctive or extrinsic, are at least somewhat natural 
in a derivative way, to the extent that they can be reached by not-too-complicated 
chains of definability from the perfectly natural properties.14  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Lewis 1986: 59. 
12 Lewis 1986: 60; italics in original. 
13 It might be helpful to distinguish between fundamental, microphysical, and natural properties. The natural properties are 
those that carve at the joints. The microphysical properties are those posited by physics. The fundamental properties are 
those that obtain, but not in virtue of other properties obtaining. Lewis (2009) refers to the fundamental properties as 
‘perfectly natural’ and Sider (forthcoming) equates fundamental properties with those envisaged by physics, i.e., 
microphysical properties. However, Schaffer (2004) argues that natural properties can occur at many levels of nature. 
For more on this discussion, see Lewis 2009: 204-205; Sider forthcoming: 119-123, 141-143; and Schaffer 92-93, 97-98. 
Also, Lewis (1986, 2009) takes naturalness to come in degrees; whereas, Sider (forthcoming) takes naturalness to be 
absolute (to be discussed below).  
14 Lewis 1986: 61; italics in original. 
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Following this shift, detecting the Higgs boson is not perfectly natural, yet it is still more natural than the 
property being a 17-mile-long particle accelerator near Geneva, Switzerland that might have detected the Higgs 
boson.  
Here, Lewis has established a certain set of privileged properties that exist independently of 
language15 and are most eligible to be the referents of our words. We can now revise our initial 
principle of reference to echo this eligibility constraint—call this principle ‘Charity Plus Lewis 
Eligibility’ or ‘CPLE’: 
Charity Plus Lewis Eligibility (CPLE): The intended interpretation of a language L is one 
on which (i) referents are assigned to expressions in L in a manner that makes the sentences 
of a theory T true, where T is the set of sentences of L that express the beliefs of speakers of 
L and (ii) the referents thus assigned are eligible, where eligibility is determined by 
naturalness, and perfectly natural properties are both microphysical and fundamental. 
By appealing to CPLE, we are able to block the A-interpretation presented by the Approximation 
World, because presumably the property being a Jellybean is more natural than the property being a 
Jellybean that was at some point hand-picked by David Klein at the Jellybelly headquarters in Fairfield, California. 
In other words, the I-interpretation, which assigns the set of Jellybeans to the expression ‘Jellybean’, 
maximizes charity—satisfying (i)16—while preserving objective naturalness—satisfying (ii). 
Conversely, on the A-interpretation, we satisfy (i) but only by sacrificing (ii).  Therefore, according 
to CPLE, the I-interpretation is the intended interpretation. 
It is not entirely clear, however, that CPLE can adequately block all bizarre interpretations. 
In the next section, I will again give a counterexample that will motivate further revision to this 
principle of reference.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This is partially a response to Putnam (1977), who objects that any attempt to offer an additional constraint must be 
done in some language that would itself be subject to the same worry about finding the semantic glue as the theory it 
attempts to save. Lewis (1984) suggests, instead, that if the additional constraint is independent of language, it’s 
presumably exempt from such arguments; cf. n. 9.  
16 As demonstrated in §2.2. 
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3.2 Counterexample Two: Belief World 
In “Craziness and Metasemantics,” John Hawthorne (2007) presents several scenarios with the 
intention of undermining Lewis’s eligibility constraint. The most pernicious of these is an example in 
which there is a twin world—call this ‘Twin Earth’—where events correspond exactly with the 
beliefs of speakers on Earth.17  
For example, again imagine that Mario is asked to guess the number of Jellybeans in The 
Mason Jar. This time, however, also imagine that there exists a distant galaxy with a Twin Earth that 
corresponds to Earth in all respects except for one: rather than there being 927 Jellybeans in the 
twin-jar, there are exactly 742 Jellybeans. Again, there are a variety of interpretations available for 
Mario’s utterance. For example, we might say that when Mario says ‘The Mason Jar’ he is referring 
to the twin-jar—call this the ‘T-interpretation’.18 The I-interpretation and the T-interpretation score 
equally well with regard to charity and, as Hawthorne (2007: 428) points out, “[T-interpretation] 
comes out no worse on the score of eligibility… . So neither charity nor eligibility can explain the 
craziness of the interpretation.” 
 Presumably Mario’s Twin, the twin-jar, and the twin-beans all have as many natural 
properties as the earthly Mario, jar, and beans do. Therefore, according to CPLE, the T-
interpretation is no worse than the I-interpretation. However, intuitively the T-interpretation is 
bizarre and, thus, incorrect. 
4. Sider 
 
4.1 Eligibility Based on the Naturalness of the Reference Relation 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For Hawthorne, the Twin Earth counterexample has an interpretation that scores higher with regard to charity 
because the events of Twin Earth correspond more closely with the beliefs of speakers on Earth than Earth events do; 
however, it is sufficient for my purposes to use an example in which the Twin Earth interpretation ties with the I-
interpretation in terms of charity. 
18 ‘T’ is for ‘Twin Earth’.  
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Even though Lewis’s revised principle of reference has not been able to block bizarre 
interpretations, e.g., interpretations on which our referents are located galaxies away, Theodore Sider 
remains sympathetic to Lewis’s project. Moreover, he suggests that by revising our notion of 
eligibility we can salvage it. 
 The problem, according to Sider, is that an adequate theory of reference will focus, not on 
the eligibility of the referent, but rather on the eligibility of the relation between the referrer and the 
referent.19 According to Sider (forthcoming: 33), 
If reference-based explanations are to be genuinely explanatory, then the reference 
relation must be a joint-carving one. … . And this excludes the bizarre 
interpretations. For only a wildly non-joint-carving relation would relate a linguistic 
population to the semantic values of a bizarre interpretation. 
 
This allows us to block bizarre interpretations such as the T-interpretation because a relation 
between Mario and the jar on Twin Earth is not suitably natural.20 We are now in a position to revise 
our revised principle of reference—call this principle ‘Charity Plus Sider Eligibility’ or ‘CPSE’: 
Charity Plus Sider Eligibility (CPSE): The intended interpretation of a language L is one 
on which (i) referents are assigned to expressions in L in a manner that makes the sentences 
of a theory T true, where T is the set of sentences of L that express the beliefs of speakers of 
L, and (ii) the relation between those speakers and the referents thus assigned is eligible, 
where eligibility is determined by naturalness, and natural properties are both microphysical 
and fundamental. 
I will now present three counterexamples that are designed to put pressure on this revised principle 
of reference.  
4.2 Counterexample Three: Stranger than Fiction World21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I will return later to the question of whether this is in keeping with other tenets of Sider’s work, and here I am not 
particularly concerned with the deeper motivations behind such a shift; cf. §5.1. 
20 Under Lewis’s theory, a model should include in the extension of ‘Jellybean’ not only worldly Jellybeans, but also 
otherworldly or twin jellybeans. This is perhaps why Lewis did not pursue eligibility as a matter of natural relations.   
21 This title is borrowed from the movie Stranger Than Fiction, where a similar scenario occurs.  
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To demonstrate that CPSE can be flawed in the same manner as PC and CPLE, I again invoke the 
story of Mario and the Jellybeans. However, before continuing, I must admit that I borrowed the 
name ‘Mario’ from a friend. And, unbeknownst to me, it might be the case that, at the very time that 
I am telling the story of the guessing contest, Mario is actually being asked to guess the precise 
number of Jellybeans in a mason jar. Mario asserts (1), the jar actually contains 927 Jellybeans, but he 
wins just the same. Here, a story that I have taken to be fiction really corresponds to some actual 
events. In this case, does my word ‘Mario’ refer to the actual person despite my having no intention 
to do so? Call this possible interpretation that assigns the actual individual Mario to my word ‘Mario’ 
the ‘F-interpretation’.22 
 A case similar to this is discussed by both David Lewis (1978: 39-40) and Saul Kripke (1980: 
157-159) and involves Arthur Conan Doyle’s stories about Sherlock Holmes. Again we can imagine 
that, while Conan Doyle was writing what he took to be fiction, there actually existed a man by the 
name of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ who lived in London and solved mysteries. Therefore, when Conan 
Doyle utters (2), the real Sherlock Holmes actually exercised before eating breakfast.  
 (2) Sherlock Holmes exercised before he ate breakfast.23 
As Lewis (1978: 39) remarks, such a case is “improbable, incredible, but surely possible!” 
Unlike in previous examples where there have been proximal objects that stand in close 
relations to the speaker, e.g., the Jellybeans and jar that are spatiotemporally nearer to Mario than the 
Twin objects are, in both instances here there are no better candidates for being the referent of 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘Mario’ than the real-life individuals who go by these names. Similarly, there 
is no better candidate for being the relation between speakers and the referents of those words than 
whatever causal or explanatory relation exists between me and the real-life Mario or between Conan 
Doyle and the real-life Holmes.  Therefore, according to CPSE, F-interpretation is the intended 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 ‘F’ is for ‘fiction’.  
23 See Conan Doyle 1904. 
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interpretation. Despite this outcome, however, we still take the F-interpretation to be highly 
counterintuitive. For example, Lewis (1978: 39) says 
Let us assume that Conan Doyle indeed wrote the stories as pure fiction. He just 
made them up. He had no knowledge of anyone who did the deeds he ascribed to 
Holmes, nor had he even picked up any garbled information originating in any such 
person … . Now consider the name “Sherlock Holmes,” as used in the stories. Does the 
name, so used, refer to the man whom Conan Doyle never heard of? Surely not! 
(Italics in original) 
 
Although Lewis here is referring to names used in the fiction, e.g., Watson’s use of ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’, the point can be extended to real-life uses of the name. Kripke (1980: 157-158), for 
example, straightforwardly rejects the claim that sentences outside of the fiction that use names 
from within the fiction could coincidently be about actual people: 
The mere discovery that there was indeed a detective with exploits like those of 
Sherlock Holmes would not show that Conan Doyle was writing about this man; it is 
theoretically possible, though in practice fantastically unlikely, that Doyle was writing 
pure fiction with only a coincidental resemblance to the actual man. (See the 
characteristic disclaimer: ‘The characters in this work are fictional, and any 
resemblance to anyone, living or dead, is purely coincidental.) (Italics in original) 
 
However, to evaluate the extent to which the Stranger Than Fiction World can serve as a 
counterexample, we must return to the details of charity that we initially glossed over. Again, 
according to PC and, consequently, CPLE and CPSE, referents are assigned to expressions in L in a 
manner that makes the sentences in T true—so the question is whether my sentences about 
someone I call ‘Mario’ express my beliefs and, thus, belong in T. There is a sense in which we would 
want a sentence such as (2) to come out true while sentences such as (2*) come out false. 
 (2*) Sherlock Holmes exercised on the treadmill before he ate breakfast.24 
This is because, given the fiction, we do not believe Sherlock Holmes exercised on a treadmill. 
Similarly, we might attempt to restrict the assertions that I can make about my fiction so that 
sentences such as ‘David Klein invented Jellybelly Jellybeans’ come out true, while others such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The treadmill was not used for aerobic exercise until around 1950, approximately 50 years after the fiction was written.  
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‘Calvin Klein invented Jellybelly Jellybeans’ come out false. It seems plausible, then, that how we talk 
about fiction is determined, in part, by the relevant facts presented within the fiction, which shape 
our beliefs. Therefore, when I make assertions such as “Mario has won the contest,” that sentence 
belongs in T; it expresses one of my beliefs. However, this coupled with CPSE leads to the 
unfortunate conclusion that my word ‘Mario’ refers to the real-life individual. But, in the event that 
we would not want such sentences to reflect our beliefs independent of the fiction, we can move on 
to the next counterexample.  
4.3 Counterexample Four: Hallucination World 
Charity requires the interpretation of L to render all sentences in L that express the beliefs of 
speakers true, but it’s unclear whether we should take sentences about fiction to be expressing 
beliefs. Therefore, in this sub-section I hope to present a case in which it is clear that the utterance 
expresses one of the speaker’s beliefs and that the bizarre interpretation scores better according to 
CPSE.  
 Imagine a scenario in which Mario is utterly fed up with guessing any amount of Jellybeans 
in any jars, either those spatially near him or those existing in other worlds. He is so unnerved by the 
repeated requests to demonstrate his speculatory prowess that the mere sight of anything Jellybean- 
or Mason-jar-related jolts him into a state of hysteria, invoking rather odd hallucinations.  
Despite his nonattendance, the annual guessing contests continue without Mario. However, 
one fateful day Mario has the extreme misfortune of unknowingly walking in on such a contest 
taking place. Upon seeing the jar of Jellybeans, Mario is sent into a fit of distress in which he 
hallucinates a past experience of guessing the Jellybeans years before and hysterically asserts (3).25 
 (3) There are at least 927 Jellybeans in The Mason Jar.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 I take it that Mario’s intention in uttering (3) is to win the contest that he’s hallucinating, which happens to be 
reminiscent of a past contest, and not to win the contest he has happened upon accidently.  
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And, coincidently enough, the jar that is in front of Mario at the time that he utters (3) does in fact 
have 927 beans in it.26 Therefore, we could create an interpretation on which the expression ‘The 
Mason Jar’ refers to the jar that is in front of Mario at the time that he utters (3)—call this ‘H-
interpretation’.27  
Just as in the Stranger than Fiction World, where the most viable referents and relations 
were the real-life persons and the relations existing between them and the referrers, in the case of 
Mario’s hallucination, the real-life perceptual and causal relations between Mario and the jar are most 
viable. Therefore the H-interpretation is the intended interpretation according to CPSE. However, 
intuitively, this is a bizarre interpretation. Consider that if this hallucination had taken place in 
Mario’s bedroom, then it’s clear Mario would have lost the contest. Moreover, the hallucination is 
the same whether he is in his bedroom or in the contest hall. Therefore, Mario’s location does little 
to affect the content of the hallucination and the mere coincidence that Mario’s hallucination 
corresponds to the real world does little to affect our intuitions. 
According to CPSE, however, the H-interpretation is the intended interpretation, since (a) 
Mario correctly guessed the number of beans in the jar that is in front of him at the time that he 
utters (3), (b) (3) expresses his beliefs (he’s hallucinating and doesn’t know it, so he believes that 
what he hallucinates is real), and, moreover, (c) the jar that is in front of Mario at the time that he 
utters (3) stands in natural relations—both causal and perceptual—to Mario.28  
4.4 Counterexample Five: Star World 
Imagine a scenario in which Mario, who is located on Earth, utters the following: 
 (4) Betelgeuse is the second brightest star in the constellation Orion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Perhaps the repetition in the amount of beans explains how it is that Mario came to have the reputation that he does.  
27 ‘H’ is for ‘hallucination’. 
28 Granted, this is a deviant causal chain. But there is definitely some causal relation between Mario and the jar that is in 
front of him at the time that he utters (3), which is all that is needed for now to satisfy CPSE. More on this discussion is 
located in §5.1 below. 
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We can adopt an interpretation that assigns to the expression ‘Betelgeuse’ the star Betelgeuse. 
However, current estimates place the location of this star to be at least 1,300 light-years away, 
allowing that Betelgeuse has already exploded.  
For the purposes of this paper, let us assume that Betelgeuse has, in fact, gone supernova 
and no longer exists. However, the light traveling away from this point in the galaxy is moving at 
such a speed that Mario is currently seeing the light from 1,300 years ago, when the star still 
existed—call this a ‘perceptual lag’. Certainly Mario is not attempting to tell a fictional story when he 
utters (4); rather, we can reasonably take him to be uttering a sentence that expresses one of his 
beliefs. This leaves us with two possible interpretations: we could interpret Mario’s utterance in such 
a way that his word ‘Betelgeuse’ refers to (A) the object that existed a millennium ago and was 
located 1,300 light-years away or (B) the light that is currently stimulating his retina.  
Since Betelgeuse is available to Mario only in virtue of his seeing it, i.e., his interacting with the 
photons traveling from the star, it seems that Mario has a more direct and, thus, more natural 
relation with the light that is currently stimulating his retina than he has with the object that existed a 
millennium ago and was located 1,300 light-years away. Whereas, on the I-interpretation ‘Betelgeuse’ 
refers to (A), we can call the interpretation that assigns (B) to ‘Betelgeuse’ ‘S-interpretation’.29 
Moreover, we could assign to the predicate ‘star’ in S-interpretation the property being a particle of light 
traveling away from the object that existed a millennium ago and was located 1,300 light-years away,30 thus making 
(4) true.  According to CPSE, the S-interpretation is the intended interpretation because it is just as 
charitable as the I-interpretation and the relation between Mario and (B) is more natural than the 
relation between Mario and (A).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 ‘S’ is for ‘star’.  
30 This is a very rough characterization of what such an assignment could be and we would need to reinterpret other 
names such as ‘constellation’; however, for this example to work, it is enough that there is some assignment that will 
satisfy (4) being true on the S-interpretation, which, according to Putnam (1977), presumably there is.  
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It seems, however, that the S-interpretation is highly unintuitive. For example, consider that 
on S-interpretation if Mario had been blind at the time that he uttered (1), the sentence would have 
been false.  This is because there is no light that is stimulating his retina (even though there are 
objects with the property being a particle of light traveling away from the object that existed a millennium ago and 
was located 1,300 light-years away).31 However, we have the intuition that Betelgeuse is the brightest star 
in the Orion constellation regardless of whether Mario can see it.  
Moreover, it seems that, although the perceptual lag is more noticeable on the grand scale, it 
must still exist to a smaller degree for every object reflecting light. Therefore, adopting the S-
interpretation has dangerous consequences for a variety of utterances within Mario’s language, not 
just those concerning stars that are light-years away. For example, according to the S-interpretation, 
when Mario utters (1) his expression ‘The Mason Jar’ actually refers to the light that has traveled 
from the jar that was in front of Mario a nanosecond before he uttered (1).32 This is because the light 
that acts as the mediator between Mario and the jar stands in a more natural relation—causal or 
perceptual—to Mario than the jar does to Mario.33 Again, CPSE does not provide the necessary 
means to block this obviously bizarre interpretation.  
5. Hawthorne and Schaffer 
5.1 Eligibility Based on Macro-Naturalism 
The theories presented thus far by Lewis and Sider have built on the original notion of charity with 
the additional constraint of eligibility. The notion of eligibility, however, is different for each. To 
better see the contrast between the two views, we must distinguish between the question of (a) 
whether it is the eligibility of the referent or the relation that matters for reference and the question 
of (b) whether eligibility is a relative or an absolute notion. For question (a) Lewis claims that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Mario is referring to the light that is stimulating his retina, as mentioned in (B). 
32 Assuming Mario is standing one foot away from the jar.  
33 Moreover, every form of sense perception has some complex route of stimulus that travels to the brain. Therefore, 
every object a speaker perceives there is some perceptual intermediary that stands in a more natural and eligible relation 
to her. Thus, every object that a speaker perceives stands in a less natural and hence less eligible relation to her than does 
some perceptual intermediary.  
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naturalness of the referents is what determines eligibility; whereas Sider claims that the naturalness 
of the reference relation is what determines eligibility. In regard to question (b), Lewis argues that 
naturalness is relative and suggests that we can grade naturalness by the definitional distance of a 
predicate (in a canonical language) that expresses one property and a predicate (in that language) that 
expresses a perfectly natural property.34 On the other hand, Sider claims that naturalness is an 
absolute notion; therefore, things are either perfectly natural or not natural. Although they disagree 
about (a) and (b), both theories adopt a notion of naturalness according to which the perfectly 
natural properties are those that exist on the microphysical ground floor, call this ‘Micro-
Naturalism’. 
 Micro-Naturalism: Natural entities are microphysical. 
Sider (forthcoming: 119-123) also posits the following principle called ‘purity’: 
Purity: Natural notions can be applied only to other natural notions. 
I will now demonstrate how Sider’s commitments to Purity and Micro-Naturalism create tension for 
his view about reference and eligibility.  
The reference relation is explanatory. That is, “one can explain certain facts by citing what 
words refer to.”35 Moreover, because reference is explanatory, it must involve only joint-carving, i.e., 
natural, notions. For example, Sider (forthcoming: 37-38) says that “reference magnetism solves the 
problems of [bizarre interpretations] … [as] a consequence of a more general claim that explanatory 
theories must be stated in joint-carving terms.” Here, Sider is making a claim that explanatory 
theories are joint-carving and, therefore, according to Purity, must involve only joint-carving 
notions.36 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 For a detailed discussion of naturalness, see above §3.1. 
35 Sider forthcoming: 32. 
36 As discussed above, Sider takes joint-carving notions, i.e., natural notions, to also be fundamental.  
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Take for example, as Sider (forthcoming: 119-123) does, the joint-carving notion of 
necessity. Proper application of this notion is demonstrated in (5).  
 (5) It’s necessary that all electrons are electrons.37 
Here, the fundamental, i.e., natural, expression ‘necessary’ combines only with other fundamental 
expressions, i.e., ‘electrons’, ‘also’, ‘all’, ‘are’. Conversely, sentences such as (6) are problematic 
applications of necessity because the fundamental expression ‘necessary’ is combined with a 
nonfundamental expression, ‘cities’, and is a violation of purity. 
 (6) It’s necessary that all cities are cities.  
According to Sider (forthcoming: 120), “fundamentally, there are no [city-facts]; so a fundamental 
notion of necessity shouldn’t contain within itself the capacity to interact with such facts.” 
 Moreover, if one accepts, as Sider claims, that reference is pure, then perfectly natural 
relations can have only perfectly natural relata; otherwise they would relate things that aren’t 
perfectly natural and violate purity. Therefore, the relata of the reference relation, i.e., the referents, 
must be perfectly natural. Also, perfectly natural entities must be microphysical entities according to 
Micro-Naturalism. However, cities, Jellybeans, and Mason jars aren’t microphysical, yet we seem to 
refer to them. This presents a problem; either (a) Sider can reject Purity, in which case natural 
notions are allowed to mingle with non-natural notions, or (b) Sider can reject Micro-Naturalism, in 
which case macrophysical entities might be natural.  
This incredibly restricted notion of naturalness, i.e., one that is pure and exists only on a 
microphysical level, seems to cause problems for Sider’s notion of eligibility and, thus, his theory of 
reference. Therefore, it is possible that, by appealing to an alternative notion of naturalness, we 
might be able to reconcile these tensions and salvage the notion of eligibility.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Assuming that electrons exist on the fundamental level of physics.  
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By drawing on the work of John Hawthorne and Jonathan Schaffer, such an alternative 
becomes available. First, Hawthorne (2007: 434) suggests that “we should … be willing to give 
relative naturalness a life of its own, one that allows properties that are of equal definitional length 
from the microphysical ground floor to be of radically unequal naturalness.” Rather than appealing 
to an austere physicalist framework that allows perfectly natural properties to exist only on the 
microphysical ground floor, Hawthorne (2005: 185-210) accepts an “emergentist” framework 
according to which naturalness “is not a matter of mere definitional distance from the microphysical 
ground floor.” In other words, Hawthorne would like to have a notion of naturalness that is 
available on various levels of nature and that does not appeal to fundamental properties. However, 
there is still a question of what such a notion should appeal to, if not the microphysical ground 
floor.  
Previous notions of naturalness relied on the presence of sparse properties on the 
fundamental level, as is evident in Lewis’s introduction of the notion of naturalness.38 However, in 
“Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties,” Jonathan Schaffer draws a distinction between the 
fundamental and the scientific conceptions of sparse properties. The former is similar to the notion of 
sparseness invoked by Lewis and Sider. By contrast, on the scientific conception, sparse properties 
are drawn from all levels of nature, not merely the most fundamental. Of these properties he says 
They are those invoked in the scientific understanding of the world …  are perfectly 
suited to ground … objective similarities … are perfectly suited to carve out the 
causal powers of macro-properties [and] … serve as the ontological basis for 
linguistic truths. 39 
 
Therefore, Hawthorne’s emergentist notion of naturalness can appeal to Schaffer’s scientific 
conception of sparse properties. Thus, a new notion of eligibility can appeal to emergentist 
naturalness, which can then be applied to macrophysical entities—call this ‘Macro-Naturalism’.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Lewis 1986: 60 
39 Schaffer 2004: 92, 95, 100. 
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 Macro-Naturalism: Natural entities can be either macrophysical or microphysical. 
Thus, our new principle of reference can appeal to this new notion of eligibility—call this principle 
‘Charity Plus Emergentist Eligibility’ or ‘CPEE’: 
Charity Plus Emergentist Eligibility: The intended interpretation of a language L is one 
on which (i) referents are assigned to expressions in L in a manner that makes the sentences 
of a theory T true, where T is the set of sentences of L that express the beliefs of speakers of 
L and (ii) the relation between those speakers and the referents thus assigned is eligible, 
where eligibility is determined by naturalness, and naturalness need not be either 
fundamental or micro-physical. 
This allows us to uphold Purity, reject Micro-Naturalism, and, thus, refer to macrophysical entities 
such as Jellybeans and Mason jars. Moreover, Macro-Naturalism is an intuitive and plausible 
alternative to Micro-Naturalism because (a) it seems that we do refer to macrophysical entities when 
we use terms like ‘Jellybean’, and (b), once we accept Macro-Naturalism, the notion of Purity and 
the theory that reference is a natural relation are cotenable. 
 I will now readdress the counterexamples provided in §4 with the new principle of reference, 
CPEE.  
5.2 Revisiting Stranger than Fiction World, Hallucination World, and Star World 
Although Macro-naturalism allows us to uphold both the principle of Purity and CPEE, it is not 
entirely clear that it will be able to block the bizarre interpretations presented in Stranger than 
Fiction World and Hallucination World Counterexamples. Unfortunately, the relations that are most 
eligible according to CPSE seem to also be most eligible according to CPEE, because there are still 
no alternatives. Therefore, even with CPEE, the F-interpretation and the H-interpretation are the 
intended interpretations for the Stranger than Fiction World and the Hallucination World, 
respectively. However, given that Schaffer (2007) introduces the notion of a scientific property to be 
a way to characterize the joint-carving nature of properties on varying levels of science (including the 
special sciences), it is possible that we could posit entities with scientific properties that could act as 
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referents for the otherwise empty names. For example, in psychology we might posit figments of the 
imagination that could act as bearers of natural properties. Thus, the object that Mario refers to 
when he says ‘The Mason Jar’ is merely a figment of his imagination. 
In regard to the Star World counterexample, it is possible, according to Macro-naturalism, to 
have natural relations towards macrophyscial entities; that is, it is possible that natural and direct 
perceptual relations, e.g., sight, exist between a macrophysical entity such as a planet and a speaker. 
Therefore, we can adopt an interpretation on which when Mario utters (4) his word ‘Betelgeuse’ 
refers to the planet Betelgeuse, which is the intuitive interpretation. Again, whether we allow 
macrophysical entities such as planets to be more natural than microphysical entities such as the 
photons of light traveling from planets depends on the way in which we characterize the scientific 
properties proposed by Schaffer (2007). For example, in astronomy we might posit planets as 
bearers of natural properties in order to better our “scientific understanding of the world;”40 thus 
making I-interpretation more eligible than S-interpretation.  
6. Conclusion 
Throughout this paper, I have explored the theories presented by Lewis and Sider to find objective 
features that can act as semantic glue and can tie our words to the objects we take ourselves to be 
referring to. As demonstrated by the various principles and counterexamples to those principles, 
both Lewis and Sider propose a principle of reference with a notion of eligibility that rests on the 
assumption that natural properties must be microphysical. As shown, the alternative of Macro-
naturalism and CPEE allows for an intuitively stronger principle of reference, yet it greatly depends 
on the way in which we formulate scientific properties. That is, CPEE depends on which properties 
we deem necessary for expanding our “scientific understanding of the world.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Schaffer 2004: 92 
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As a final note, if we are unwilling to allow for any macrophysical, scientific properties, e.g., 
the figments presented in §5.2, it is difficult for me to see how, regardless of the way in which the 
principle is formulated, eligibility is supposed to “save” reference in scenarios such as Stranger than 
Fiction World, Hallucination World, and Star World. That is, I’m not sure how an objective feature 
found in the world, e.g., naturalness, is going to be able to provide the means by which we tie down 
reference between a referrer and a referent when the intended interpretation is one on which there is 
no referent.  
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